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Scientific knowledge has been accepted as the main driver of development, allowing for longer,
healthier, and more comfortable lives. Still, public support to scientific research is wavering, with
large numbers of people being uninterested or even hostile towards science. This is having serious
social consequences, from the anti-vaccination community to the recent "post-truth" movement.
Such lack of trust and appreciation for science was first justified as lack of knowledge, leading to
the “Deficit Model” [1, 2]. As an increase in scientific information did not necessarily lead to a
greater appreciation, this model was largely rejected, giving rise to “Public Engagement Models”
[3]. These try to offer more nuanced, two-way, communication pipelines between experts and the
general public, strongly respecting non-expert knowledge, possibly even leading to an undervaluing
of science. Therefore, we still lack an encompassing theory that can explain public understanding of
science, allowing for more targeted and informed approaches. Here, we use a large dataset from the
Science and Technology Eurobarometer surveys, over 25 years in 34 countries [4], and find evidence
that a combination of confidence and knowledge is a good predictor of attitudes towards science.
This is contrary to current views, that place knowledge as secondary, and in line with findings
in behavioral psychology, particularly the Dunning-Kruger effect, as negative attitudes peak at
intermediate levels of knowledge, where confidence is largest. We propose a new model, based on
the superposition of the Deficit and Dunning-Kruger models and discuss how this can inform science
communication.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Scientific research has been strongly supported by so-
cieties through agencies that channel public funds to-
wards research grants and fellowships, under the assump-
tion that science drives the “Knowledge-based Society”.
This investment is dependent on public support [5] and,
from the 1960’s onward, a number of surveys began to
be applied trying to gauge both “hard knowledge” and
the public’s attitude towards science and scientific dis-
coveries [2, 6]. The surprising finding that some of the
public was, not only unknowledgeable, but also disen-
gaged or even actively hostile led to the establishment of
a “Deficit Model”. In simple terms, this model claimed
that public skepticism towards science was due to lack
of understanding [7] and that the more one knows about
science, the more positive one’s attitude towards science
is (“to know it is to love it”) [1, 2]. Its corollary was that
experts and educators should engage with the ignorant
public to improve their knowledge, directly leading to an
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improvement in support.
In the 1980’s this model, that can be crudely repre-
sented by the plot in Fig. 3A, started to face severe crit-
icism for several reasons, and by the early 2000’s it had
mostly been discredited [2, 3, 8–12]. First, the concep-
tion of a unidirectional communication between scien-
tific experts and the community implied a disregard for
the lay public’s views and has been replaced with a two-
way stream of dialogue, debate, and discussion, leading
to “Public-engagement" or “Interactive” models [3]. Sec-
ond, the definitions of both knowledge and attitude be-
come more fluid: knowledge is no longer seen as simple
textbook information that can be uniquely tested and as-
signed to a single variable [13], and the notion of a single
positive or negative “attitude” towards scientific subjects
has been replaced with the possibility of nuanced “atti-
tudes”, which can vary widely depending on the subject,
question at hand, context, time [7, 14–16], and even po-
litical identity [17–19]. Third, there is growing evidence
that offering information on controversial issues, or on
issues where people hold strong prior beliefs, does not
change people’s minds and can even backfire [20, 21], by
polarizing opinions [22] or even by eroding trust in the
scientific method itself [23].
Thus, while this relationship between knowledge(s)
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2and attitude(s) has guided most of the discussion around
science communication and public understanding of sci-
ence in the past decade [24], it is now clear that knowl-
edge alone cannot fully predict attitudes [25]. However,
when some knowledge and attitude variables can be iden-
tified, close re-examinations of survey data have con-
firmed that there is a central role to knowledge in the
determination of attitudes: this role is much more com-
plex than the linear relation purported by the “Deficit
Model”, but it is real and in general there is a positive
association between higher knowledge and an overall pos-
itive attitude [2, 12, 16, 24, 26, 27].
Interestingly, this correlation disappears when the sub-
ject is controversial and the respondent tends to be
knowledgeable [24]. Offering “too easy” science texts
might lead to overconfidence and underrate the need
for experts [28], and just searching for information on-
line on one subject leads to people to overestimate their
knowledge on an unrelated subject [29]. Dunning and
Kruger have shown that confidence grows faster than
knowledge [30] and this effect might be relevant in the
anti-vaccination movement, with surveyed “anti-vaxxers”
overestimating their knowledge on autism, and overcon-
fidence being largest for lowest knowledge bins [31]. To-
gether, this suggests that confidence might play an im-
portant, while overlooked, role in modulating the rela-
tionship between knowledge and attitudes towards sci-
ence.
In this work, we take advantage of 5 rounds of the
Science and Technology Eurobarometer questionnaires,
a dataset including 34 countries between 1989 and 2005,
and ask whether confidence modulates public under-
standing of science. By analyzing the relation between
knowledge (k), attitudes (att) and a new confidence vari-
able (c), we find that there is a consistent and strong
non-linear correlation between attitudes and knowledge,
and that this relation can be explained by varying levels
of confidence. We propose a new testable model and dis-
cuss how it can guide future research and interventions.
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS
Computations were performed using R 3.4.4, Microsoft
Excel 16 and Wolfram Mathematica 10.
A. Dataset
The Science and Technology Eurobarometer cam-
paigns from 1989 and 2005 surveyed a total of 34 coun-
tries, including EU members, candidates at the time,
and other European Economic Area (EEA) countries, to-
talling 84469 individual interviews [4]. Unlike previous
and subsequent campaigns, this set asked questions that
tried to gauge bot knowledge and attitudes, in a con-
sistent way. However, there were differences both in the
questions asked and in the possible answers, and the main
dataset results from an harmonization effort that took
the November 1992 (EB 38.1) round as a base and iden-
tified similar variables in the remaining four rounds (see
Table S1). The harmonization was performed by taking
the variable in the 1992 Eurobarometer and identifying
items with similar wordings on the other four campaigns.
For simplicity, this harmonized dataset is referred to as
the Eurobarometer dataset throughout the text.
B. Attitude variables
In each Eurobarometer round, a number of questions
regarding possible attitudes towards science were asked.
For each item, the interviewee is asked to declare agree-
ment or disagreement with a given statement. As stated
above, the November 1992 (EB 38.1) round was chosen
as a basis and similar variables (with almost identical
wording) were identified in the remaining four rounds.
Thus, the Eurobarometer dataset contains an intersec-
tion of the questions that were asked in each round and
contains the 10 attitude variables, listed in Table S2, that
are found in all rounds except, in some cases, 1989.
The possible answers to the attitude questions are also
not consistent: 1) the “don’t know” option was always
present but a neutral option such as “neither agree nor
disagree” was only offered in 1989, 1992 and 2005; 2) the
available options on the Likert scale were sometimes five
and and others two, as shown in Table S3.
As these differences may have an impact on the re-
spondents’ behaviour [16], we tested its impact in three
different ways: 1) by treating all the categories in the Lik-
ert scale either separately or fusing them into less options
(adding the “strongly agree” with the “agree to some ex-
tent” and the “disagree to some extent” with the “strongly
disagree”); 2) by either including or disregarding the “nei-
ther agree nor disagree”; and 3) by either aggregating the
“neither agree nor disagree” with the “dont’ know” an-
swers, or by treating them separately. These alternatives
make up for a total of six different approaches to the
data. We performed many of the calculations that follow
in all six ways in order to establish that the choice for a
given approach does not significantly affect the results.
To obtain a measurement or a smaller set of measure-
ments for attitude(s) towards science, we computed their
10 × 10 Spearman correlation matrix and performed a
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) (see Figure S3A).
We found that the answers are mostly uncorrelated and
that there is no single component explaining a large per-
centage of the variation. We describe these findings in
greater detail in the main text and thus treat all attitude
variables independently.
It is important to note that, regardless of the polarity
of the questions, “Agree" and “Strongly Agree" answers
are typically more prevalent than disagreement answers,
a common effect, known as “acquiescence bias" [15, 32].
Therefore, in the results we focus particularly on the
“Agree" answers, and these tend to show a stronger effect.
3C. Knowledge Variables
The Eurobarometer dataset includes 13 “true or false”
questions, listed in Table S4, designed to assess knowl-
edge on science related subjects, with a “don’t know”
option always available.
Similarly to the attitude questions set, we tested in-
dependence by calculating Spearman correlation and by
performing a PCA (see Figure S3B). We created a single
knowledge variable, k, computed from the ratio of cor-
rect answers to the number of questions each individual
was asked. Thus, a “don’t know” is considered equiva-
lent to an incorrect answer as far as the measurement of
knowledge is concerned.
D. Confidence Measurement
The neutral and “don’t know” answers can offer a pos-
sible measure of confidence. We use the aggregates of the
“neither agree nor disagree” and the “don’t know” answers
to the attitude questions, to which we call “neutral" an-
swers, and the “don’t know” answers to the knowledge
questions as a measure of confidence. As before, this
classification does not offer a direct measurement of con-
fidence, but serves as a general indicator, when compared
to the other variables.
E. Mathematical Model
The Deficit Model (DM) can be represented as a linear
relation between attitudes, att, and knowledge, k, of the
form
attDM(k) = αk+ β, α ≤ 1, β ≥ 0, (1)
with higher knowledge leading to a more positive atti-
tude. However, from 1A, we can observe a quadratic
relation between confidence, c, and knowledge. This re-
lation (that has been reported for the Dunning-Krugger
effect, D-K), can be derived directly from the curve and
be written as
cD-K(k) = γk
2 + δk+ , (2)
by fitting these curves we find that
γ ' −1, δ ' 2,  ' 0.1. (3)
The proposed model is obtained by multiplying these
two relations, with the Deficit Model inverted for nega-
tive attitudes,
-att(k) = cD-K(k)× (1− attDM(k)), (4)
leading to an inverted-U shaped curve. Taking the confi-
dence curve as an experimental result, better fits to the
curves in each attitude item can be obtained by adjust-
ing the α and β parameters in our representation of the
Deficit Model.
III. RESULTS
Attitudes towards science
Public attitudes towards science depend on several fac-
tors and it is not clear how much of a role knowledge
plays. By using a large-scale database we tested: 1)
whether it is possible to define “attitude(s)” towards sci-
ence, 2) whether these vary with knowledge, and 3) what
modulates such variation.
We thus started by asking whether it is possible to
identify single, or a small subset of attitudes towards sci-
ence. We extended the work of [16] and included all Eu-
robarometers and countries, offering not only more data
and statistical power, but also the possibility of compar-
ing the results longitudinally.
First, we compared all attitude variables and found
that they are weakly correlated (< 0.33), with only two
groups of variables with relatively higher correlations:
one that might be associated with an optimistic attitude
and another with overall distrust, as shown in Figure S1.
Second, we performed a PCA and found, as [16] before
us, that this system does not justify the grouping of some
attitudinal questions, as can be seen in Figure S3A. In-
deed, the first and most significant principal component
accounts for less than 20% of the variance and even the
first 5 components only represent around 65%, with the
last and less significant of 10 components still holding
almost 5% of the variance.
Third, a series of attempts at factor analysis did not
identify any set of factors modelling the behaviour of the
attitude variables.
Thus, we found no mathematical justification for the
construction of an attitude scale or of a small set of scales.
In fact, these attempts indicate that there is a high level
of independence between the variables. Thus, all attitude
variables are treated separately, in the rest of the work.
A. Attitudes and Knowledge
In the surveys, respondents were asked to state
whether 13 science-related statements were true or false.
We started by testing independence and found that, sim-
ilarly to the attitude questions, the knowledge answers
are poorly correlated. However, this can be explained in
great part by the fact that the questions have different
difficulty levels, with some questions displaying a much
higher number of correct answers. Also, contrary to the
attitudes questions, the PCA reveals that the first com-
ponent explains 25% of the variance, with all components
having the same sign, indicating that answering one ques-
tion correctly, increases the likelihood of giving the right
answer to other questions, as depicted in Figure S3B. In
fact, the distribution of correct answers is approximately
Normal, as expected (see horizontal axes distributions in
Fig. 1).
4TABLE I. Slopes of “agreement” linear regressions of attitude
variables plotted against knowledge as measured by k vari-
able.
“Agree” slope R2
att_comfort 0.12 0.97
att_natural_resources −0.31 0.94
att_faith −0.42 0.95
att_environ −0.35 0.97
att_research_animal ∼ 0
att_res_dangerous −0.08 0.3
att_interest 0.06 0.74
att_daily_life −0.57 0.99
att_fast −0.26 0.91
att_oppor 0.05 0.8
Therefore, and as for the purposes of this project we
were not so much interested in measuring individual
knowledge as in finding relations between this measure
and the identified attitudes, we created a single k vari-
able, where k corresponds to the fraction of correct an-
swers, from 0 (no correct answers) to 1 (all questions
answered correctly).
When we plotted the different attitudes by knowledge,
we found that they also vary differently. Table I shows
the slopes and fit of the linear regressions for the propor-
tion of “agreement” answers for all attitude questions. We
find that while some have strong dependencies on knowl-
edge (higher absolute slopes), either positive or negative,
others are virtually independent (lower absolute slopes).
Fig. 2A and D show examples of the attitude questions
that fall within each of these two groups (full results in
Fig. S6).
Our analysis does not identify any interesting pattern,
with both controversial and less controversial issues (from
the possibility of harming animals in research to whether
science makes our liver more interesting), being basically
independent from k, and strong dependencies appearing
in issues of faith and comfort.
These results, seem to support the current views that
not only there is no single variable that describes a set of
“attitudes” towards science, but also there is no simple re-
lationship between such attitudes and knowledge. How-
ever, both ours and past analysis, have focused only on
respondents that state either an agreement or a disagree-
ment with the questions. And it has long been known
that many people offer answers to survey questions when
they are unknowleageable of the subject, and even when
the subjects at hand are fictitious [33].
Therefore, we decided to study the impact of the “don’t
know” and “neither agree nor disagree” answers in this
context.
B. Knowledge and Confidence
We started by analyzing the impact of the “don’t know”
answers, in the knowledge questions, knowing that the
fraction of correct answers varies with an approximately
Normal distribution (Fig. 1). The interesting question is
whether there is variation in the ratio of wrong to “don’t
know” answers as we propose that this variation might
offer us a measure of confidence.
A perfectly rational individual would modulate their
confidence on a specific subject to their knowledge on
that subject. Therefore, a perfect match between how
much one knows (k) and how much one thinks one knows
(confidence) would lead to a complete absence of wrong
answers, with respondents either answering correctly or
selecting the “don’t know” option. In this case, as the per-
centage of correct answers increased from 0 to 100%, the
number of “don’t know” answers would decrease symmet-
rically, creating a perfect diagonal. This line would inter-
sect at 100% on both axes (solid black line on Fig. 1A).
If the incorrect answers did not depend on either
knowledge or confidence (for example, if wrong answers
were caused by randomly distributed errors), they should
vary linearly with k and we would also observe the ideal
line shifting down by an amount equal to the average
fraction of incorrect answers, intersecting the axes at
lower values. However, if the incorrect answers are modu-
lated by confidence, with individuals overestimating their
knowledge, we should observe non-linear (non-diagonal)
relationships. And if the number of wrong answers grows
faster than the number of ”Correct" and “Don’t know”
answers, this will be represented as a deviation from the
diagonal towards a concave curve, and can be interpreted
as the confidence growing faster than knowledge.
To study how confidence varies with k, we analyzed
how the number of “don’t know” answers varies with the
different k bins. This can be represented by the linear
fit of the fraction of “don’t know” as a function of the
fraction of correct answers per bin (dashed black line in
Fig. 1A). Thus, we may use this deviation as a measure
of overconfidence of the respondents.
As can be seen in Fig. 1A, the quadratic fit curve is
indeed concave, suggesting that confidence tends to grow
much faster than k.
An equivalent way of looking at these results is by
plotting the incorrect answers as a function of correct
answers, which we tentatively identify with overconfi-
dence and knowledge, respectively. The results in Fig. 1B
clearly show how the probability of wrong answers is
maximum in the intermediate levels of knowledge and
not at the lower, as would be expected if overconfidence
was evenly distributed.
As we are looking at the sum of all possibilities within
the same k bin, over more than 80 000 questionnaires,
this curve can appear both when the individuals have
very similar behaviours or when we have different popu-
lations, with some populations displaying very low wrong
to “don’t know” ratios and some displaying very high.
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FIG. 1. Density histogram of the distribution of respondents according to the fraction of correct answers and fraction of “don’t
know” answers (panel A) or incorrect answers (panel B). The dotted and dashed lines are the linear and quadratic regressions,
respectively. Bars on the axes show distributions for each variable, all in the same [0, 1] scale. These charts show how the
fraction of “don’t know” answers decreases more rapidly than the increase in knowledge, evidence of overconfidence. If each
respondent only answered to the questions to which they know the answer, then the curve in Panel A would follow the diagonal
thin line and there would be no incorrect answers, a flat line at zero in Panel B. Instead, we see the lowest knowledge bins very
close to this “ideal confidence” line with the highest levels of overconfidence in the intermediate knowledge bins, coinciding with
the highest proportions of incorrect answers.
Therefore, we repeated this analysis for each of the 34
countries individually, and confirm that confidence grows
faster than knowledge in all surveyed countries (Figs. S4
and S5). We also find some small but consistent differ-
ences between them as, with few exceptions, respondents
from the most developed, and generally more educated
countries (Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, Netherlands,
West Germany) show the highest confidence gap, with
the ratio of wrong to right answers in the low k bins, be-
ing over 50% (as gauged by the intersect of the linear fit
in the y-axis).
This is suggestive of an effect similar to what has been
observed by Dunning and Kruger in the USA [30], leading
us to look for what effects this observed overconfidence
may have on the attitude items.
C. Attitudes and Confidence
As described in the methods, the different Eurobarom-
eter surveys followed different policies, with some includ-
ing the neutral “neither agree nor disagree”, and others
only allowing the “don’t know” option. As others be-
fore us [16], we found that the sum of these two tends
to be constant (a person that would respond “neither
agree nor disagree” to a given item is likely to choose
“don’t know” if the first option is not available). Thus,
we used the sum of these two variables, generally calling
them “neutral answers”, and compared their usage across
all attitude variables. Respondents offer either “agree”
or “disagree” answers in the large majority of instances,
with neutral choices varying between 11% and 22% of the
total answers. As it is possible that this variation stems
from individual options, we looked at the correlation be-
tween people who tend to answer “don’t know” to the k
questions and people who tend to offer neutral answers to
the attitude questions. We controlled these relationships
between attitudes and knowledge for education level and
observed that the behaviour remains substantially the
same.
As seen in Fig. 1A, the proportion of “don’t know” an-
swers decreases more rapidly than the increase in correct
answers (Fig. 1B) with the highest fractions of incorrect
answers encountered in the mid k range and not in the
lower k categories.
Similarly, we could expect the individuals in the lower
k bins (who answered proportionately more “don’t know”
to the k questions), to also offer more neutral answers to
the attitude questions. This is indeed what we observe:
the neutral answers have a sharp decline in the lower k
bins in every single attitude item, with only small varia-
tions, and remains very close to zero, in the mid to high
k bins, as exemplified in Fig. 2B and E.
We had observed that attitudes vary inconsistently
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(att_daily_life) "For me, in my daily life, it is not important to know about science."
(att_comfort) "Science & Technology are making our lives healthier, easier and more comfortable."
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FIG. 2. Relative frequencies of agreement, disagreement and neutral stance for each knowledge category towards the statements
“For me, in my daily life, it is not important to know about science” (upper row) and “Science & Technology are making our lives
healthier, easier and more comfortable” (lower row), shown here as examples of two distinct behaviours of attitude variables.
Upper row shows an example of an asymmetric behaviour of agreement and disagreement, with the distinct “inverted U” curve
appearing in the negative attitude. Lower row shows an item with a mostly flat disagreement curve and monotonously crescent
agreement curve. Shaded areas highlight the four consecutive knowledge bins with highest agreement in each attitude item.
with knowledge, with some having strong and others
showing very little dependence with k. This was done
by calculating the frequency of "agree" versus "disagree"
answers, and disregarding the "don’t know" or "neither
agree nor disagree" (neutral) options. When we now re-
analyze this dependence, but including the neutral an-
swers, we find not only different behaviours across dif-
ferent attitudes, but very asymmetrical effects between
agreement and disagreement positions (Fig. 2). In fact,
all previously linear relationships (Fig. 2A and D), now
become quadratic, often displaying either “inverted U”
shape curves (Fig. 2C) or asymptotic behaviour (Fig. 2F),
especially in the agreement answers, as discussed in the
methods.
Interestingly, by including the neutral answers in the
analysis, this non-linear behaviour now appears in all at-
titude items, with the most negative attitudes appearing
at intermediate levels of k, that also correspond to the
highest confidence to k ratios. Shaded areas in Figs. 2 and
S6 show where the four consecutive k bins with highest
agreement are, allowing for a clear distinction between
“inverted-U” and asymptotic curves. Therefore, attitudes
are not independent of knowledge, as current theories de-
fend, neither do they appear to be more negative in lower
knowledge bins, as the Deficit Model would predict.
Many of the attitudes that can be identified as nega-
tive seem to be modulated by a combination of knowledge
and confidence, as represented in Fig. 3. Therefore, we
developed a simple mathematical model, that combines
the linear relationship predicted by the Deficit Model
and the quadratic relation observed from the curve in
Fig. 1A, that confirms the Dunning-Kruger effect. This
new model, that simply multiplies both relations (as de-
scribed in the Methods), leads to an inverted-U shaped
curve, observed in many of the negative attitude items,
as shown in Fig. 3. Importantly, the attitude items have
different dependencies on knowledge among them, even
before accounting for neutral answers and the effect of
confidence, and this can be easily modulated by changes
in the fitting parameters.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Our work builds on the long-lasting and ongoing dis-
cussion of what are the best predictors of public attitudes
towards science. By creating a dataset of several rounds
of the Science and Technology Eurobarometers and an-
alyzing the ratio of correct to incorrect answers to the
knowledge questions, we found that this does not vary lin-
early, with the majority of incorrect answers appearing at
intermediate levels of knowledge. Similarly, the number
of neutral answers to the attitude items drops very fast,
approaching its minimum for intermediate knowledge lev-
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FIG. 3. Proposed model of the observed behaviour of negative attitudes towards science. The Deficit Model is shown on the
left as a simple linear relationship between knowledge and (positive) attitudes, whereas the Dunning-Kruger effect model in
the center is derived directly from the curve in Fig. 1A. The resulting inverted-U curve model on the right is the product of
negative attitudes Deficit Model with the Dunning-Kruger confidence curve.
els. Arguing that this variation in the number of neutral
answers, both for the knowledge and the attitudes ques-
tions, can be used as a proxy for confidence, we found
that 1) confidence grows much faster that knowledge,
in line with previous works that identify the Dunning-
Kruger effect as relevant in the anti-science movements
[31, 34]; 2) that the least positive attitudes are found for
these high-confidence / average knowledge groups, creat-
ing an inverted U-curve; and 3) that public attitudes to-
wards science can be explained by a non-linear combina-
tion of both knowledge (following from the Deficit Model)
and confidence (following from the Dunning-Kruger ef-
fect), proposing a new theoretical model (Fig. 3C).
Interestingly, and contrary to the cited works [31, 34],
the least positive attitudes are not found at the lowest
k bins, and four non mutually exclusive possibilities can
explain this difference. First, the anti-vaccine, GMO and
climate change issues are highly controversial with po-
larized populations for or against it, while this is not the
case for most of the attitudes tested in the Eurobarometer
dataset. The respondents in [31, 34] have strong opinions
and are likely to believe to be very well informed, while
the respondents in this dataset are least confident in the
low k bins. This is in line with the predictions of the
Dunning-Kruger effect, as confidence peaks in the middle
and not for low k. Second, these are also issues for which
there are large amounts of false information circulating
online. Therefore, strong advocates against GMOs, cli-
mate change and vaccines are likely to believe to be right.
They might know of the scientific consensus and choose
not offer it as the correct answer. Again, this is unlikely
to be the case with the surveyed for these Eurobarome-
ters. Third, there is a significant time gap between the
different surveys. The last round of the Eurobarometer
took place in 2005 and, although we do not see longi-
tudinal differences, this dataset was built mostly before
the wide expansion of the internet and of online social
networks. It is easy to argue that this misinformation
and polarization might be made worse by these recent
technologies, with the creation of echo-chambers and in-
formation bubbles. These may limit the quantity, quality,
and diversity of information accessible to the non-expert
public, effectively creating large groups of misinformed
citizens. And the politicizing of science together with an
increase in political polarization [35] might deepen this
divide even further.
It also important to note that, to our knowledge, the
DK effect had not been consistently shown outside of the
USA, and the most developed and educated countries
seem to display larger confidence to k gaps. Therefore, it
is possible that, if this Eurobarometer was to be repeated,
we would observe an even larger gap between confidence
and k, across countries, as the citizens become more con-
nected and confident, and possibly an even stronger po-
larization in the answers to the attitude items. Thus, we
argue that, despite its problems, a new round of this or
a very similar survey is in order.
Taken together, our results have clear implications to
current science communication strategies. Our model
predicts that receptiveness to science will be stronger at
the lowest and highest knowledge bins, where the C/K
ratios are also lowest. Offering information that is in-
complete, partial, or over simplified, as science commu-
nicators often do, might indeed backfire, as it may offer
a false sense of knowledge to the public, leading to over-
confidence, and less support.
In fact, if the lowest support for science comes from the
over-confident, these might also be the ones more resis-
tant to new information, especially if it contradicts their
certainty, creating a negative reinforcement loop. This
8resistance to change has been shown in several behavioral
psychology studies, and presented as cognitive biases,
such as the confirmatory tendencies. Importantly, these
intermediate k and high confidence bins, correspond to
the majority of the individuals surveyed. This effect was
not important in our analysis, as all bins were normal-
ized by frequency, but is fundamental at a population
level, as they are likely to correspond to a large group of
European demographics.
If indeed negative attitudes can be explained by a com-
bination of limited knowledge and excess confidence, de-
veloping science communication strategies that offer a
good balance between sharing not only accurate and pre-
cise information, but also large doses of humility, both
on the scientists and the lay public’s side, is likely to
be a fundamental, while very difficult task. A multidisci-
plinary approach, building from cognitive and behavioral
psychology, social media and complex systems analysis,
should receive a new focus, so that we move from a post-
truth world, by avoiding the dangers of the "little knowl-
edge".
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9Appendix A: Supplementary Data
TABLE S1. List of Eurobarometer rounds used to compile the harmonized dataset from Ref. [4], used in this paper. EB 38.1
was used as a reference for the identification of similar variables to construct the harmonized dataset, with countries surveyed
in each Science and Technology Eurobarometer round.
Candidate
Round Eurobarometer Eurobarometer Eurobarometer Country EB Eurobarometer
31 38.1 55.2 2002.3 63.1
Dates Mar-Apr 1989 Nov 1992 May-Jun 2001 Oct-Nov 2002 Jan-Feb 2005
1 France • • • - •
2 Belgium • • • - •
3 Netherlands • • • - •
4 West Germany • • • - •
5 Italy • • • - •
6 Luxembourg • • • - •
7 Denmark • • • - •
8 Ireland • • • - •
9 Great Britain • • • - •
10 Northern Ireland • • • - •
11 Greece • • • - •
12 Spain • • • - •
13 Portugal • • • - •
14 East Germany - • • - •
15 Finland - • - •
16 Sweden - - • - •
17 Austria - - • - •
18 Cyprus - - - • •
19 Czech Republic - - - • •
20 Estonia - - - • •
21 Hungary - - - • •
22 Latvia - - - • •
23 Lithuania - - - • •
24 Malta - - - • •
25 Poland - - - • •
26 Slovakia - - - • •
27 Slovenia - - - • •
28 Bulgaria - - - • •
29 Romania - - - • •
30 Turkey - - - • •
31 Iceland - - - - •
32 Croatia - - - - •
33 Switzerland - - - - •
34 Norway - - - - •
Total 13 14 17 13 34
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TABLE S2. Set of 9 attitude variables in the Eurobarometer dataset. For each statement respondents were asked to state their
agreement or disagreement. Starred items (∗) do not have data for 1989.
Long Code Statement
att_comfort “Science & Technology are making our lives healthier, easier and more com-
fortable.”
∗att_natural_resources “Thanks to scientific and technological advances, the earth’s natural resources
will be inexhaustible.”
att_faith “We depend too much on science and not enough on faith”
∗att_environ “Scientific and technological research cannot play an important role in protect-
ing the environment and repairing it.”
∗att_research_animal “Scientists should be allowed to do research that causes pain and injury to
animals like dogs and chimpanzees if it can produce information about human
health problems.”
∗att_res_dangerous “Because of their knowledge, scientific researchers have a power that makes
them dangerous.”
∗att_interest “The application of science and new technology will make work more interest-
ing.”
∗att_daily_life “For me, in my daily life, it is not important to know about science.”
att_fast “Science makes our way of life change too fast.”
∗att_oppor “Thanks to science and technology, there will be more opportunities for the
future generations.”
TABLE S3. Available answers for attitude items in each Eurobarometer campaign contained in the dataset.
EB 31 EB 38.1 EB 55.2 Candidate EB 2002.3 EB 63.1
Mar-Apr 1989 Nov 1992 May-Jun 2001 Oct-Nov 2002 Jan-Feb 2005
Strongly agree • • - - •
Agree to some extent • • • • •
Neither agree nor disagree • • - - •
Disagree to some extent • • • • •
Strongly disagree • • - - •
Don’t know • • • • •
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att_research_animal 1 0,094 0,118 0,140 -0,004 0,024 0,047 0,081 0,023 -0,008
att_comfort 0,094 1 0,251 0,277 0,029 -0,032 -0,013 0,091 -0,096 -0,097
att_interest 0,118 0,251 1 0,364 0,036 0,000 0,046 0,065 -0,047 -0,097
att_oppor 0,140 0,277 0,364 1 0,029 -0,011 0,038 0,047 -0,079 -0,090
att_res_dangerous -0,004 0,029 0,036 0,029 1 0,135 0,207 -0,014 0,028 0,035
att_faith 0,024 -0,032 0,000 -0,011 0,135 1 0,219 0,044 0,103 0,099
att_fast 0,047 -0,013 0,046 0,038 0,207 0,219 1 0,034 0,081 0,078
att_natural_resources 0,081 0,091 0,065 0,047 -0,014 0,044 0,034 1 0,146 0,106
att_environ 0,023 -0,096 -0,047 -0,079 0,028 0,103 0,081 0,146 1 0,167
att_daily_life -0,008 -0,097 -0,097 -0,090 0,035 0,099 0,078 0,106 0,167 1
FIG. S1. Spearman correlation matrix of attitude variables, showing their weak correlations and ordered to show the also weak
clusters.
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k_oxygen 1 0,086 0,046 0,020 0,065 0,051 0,047 0,056 0,074 0,076 0,081 0,157 0,139
k_human 0,086 1 0,084 0,081 0,102 0,094 0,111 0,105 0,061 0,076 0,120 0,131 0,188
k_gene 0,046 0,084 1 0,159 0,120 0,137 0,104 0,121 0,057 0,101 0,103 0,090 0,151
k_antibiotics 0,020 0,081 0,159 1 0,256 0,252 0,263 0,292 0,114 0,160 0,117 0,124 0,168
k_dinosaurs 0,065 0,102 0,120 0,256 1 0,266 0,263 0,284 0,155 0,221 0,160 0,167 0,212
k_milk 0,051 0,094 0,137 0,252 0,266 1 0,280 0,310 0,199 0,211 0,146 0,178 0,211
k_lasers 0,047 0,111 0,104 0,263 0,263 0,280 1 0,350 0,188 0,239 0,215 0,160 0,181
k_radioactivity 0,056 0,105 0,121 0,292 0,284 0,310 0,350 1 0,231 0,251 0,211 0,201 0,237
k_sun 0,074 0,061 0,057 0,114 0,155 0,199 0,188 0,231 1 0,282 0,140 0,175 0,123
k_time 0,076 0,076 0,101 0,160 0,221 0,211 0,239 0,251 0,282 1 0,196 0,166 0,177
k_electron 0,081 0,120 0,103 0,117 0,160 0,146 0,215 0,211 0,140 0,196 1 0,162 0,214
k_earth 0,157 0,131 0,090 0,124 0,167 0,178 0,160 0,201 0,175 0,166 0,162 1 0,261
k_continents 0,139 0,188 0,151 0,168 0,212 0,211 0,181 0,237 0,123 0,177 0,214 0,261 1
FIG. S2. Spearman correlation matrix of knowledge variables, showing their fairly weak correlations and ordered to show the
also weak clusters.
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TABLE S4. Set of 13 knowledge variables in the Eurobarometer dataset, with question statement and possible answers; A
“don’t know” option was also available in each question. The correct answer is starred (∗).
Code Question Answers
k_earth “The centre of the Earth is very hot.” ∗“True” or “False”
k_oxygen “The oxygen we breathe comes from plants.” ∗“True” or “False”
k_milk “Radioactive milk can be made safe by boiling it.” “True” or ∗“False”
k_electron “Electrons are smaller than atoms.” ∗“True” or “False”
k_continents “The continents on which we live have been moving their
location for million of years and will continue to move in
the future.”
∗“True” or “False”
k_gene “It is the father’s gene which decides whether the baby is
a boy or a girl.”
∗“True” or “False”
k_dinosaurs “The earliest humans lived at the same time as the di-
nosaurs.”
“True” or ∗“False”
k_antibiotics “Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria.” “True” or ∗“False”
k_lasers “Lasers work by focusing sound waves.” “True” or ∗“False”
k_radioactivity “All radioactivity is man-made.” “True” or ∗“False”
k_human “Human beings, as we know them today, developed from
earlier species of animals.”
∗“True” or “False”
k_sun “Does the earth go around the sun or does the sun go
around the earth?”
“The sun goes around the
earth” or ∗“The earth goes
around the sun”
k_time “How long does it take for the earth to go around the
sun?”
∗“Year” or “Month”
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Attitudes
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FIG. S3. Proportion of variance for each principal component resulting from the PCA ran on the knowledge and attitude
variables. (A) Attitude variables PCA, with full line for binning of answers into positive, negative and neutral, other binning
methods as superimposed dotted lines. There is a slow and steady decline in the proportion of variance throughout, with the
first few principal components failing to provide a large enough proportion of the total variance to be useful. (B) Knowledge
variables PCA, with full line considering the aggregation of incorrect and “don’t know” answers and dotted line keeping them
distinct. The first principal component accounts for a significantly larger part of the total variance and its coefficients all have
the same sign.
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FIG. S4. Fits of the distribution of respondents according to the fraction of correct answers and fraction of “don’t know”
answers by country. The dotted and dashed lines are the linear and quadratic regressions, respectively. Compare with Fig. 1A.
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FIG. S5. Fits of the distribution of respondents according to the fraction of correct answers and fraction of wrong answers by
country. The dotted and dashed lines are the linear and quadratic regressions, respectively. Compare with Fig. 1B.
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(att_research_animal)
"Scientists should be allowed to research that causes pain and injury to animals like dogs and chimpanzees if it can 
produce information about human health problems."
(att_natural_resources)
"Thanks to scientific and technological advances, the earth's natural resources will be inexhaustible."
(att_faith)
"We depend too much on science and not enough on faith."
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"Scientific and technological research cannot play an important role in protecting the environment and repairing it."
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(att_res_dangerous)
"Because of their knowledge, scientific researchers have a power that makes them dangerous."
(att_interest)
"The application of science and new technology will make work more interesting."
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(att_fast)
"Science makes our way of life change too fast."
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
k
Without neutral answers
Agreement Disagreement
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
k
With neutral answers
Agreement Disagreement Neutral
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
k
With neutral answers
Agreement Disagreement Neutral
(att_oppor)
"Thanks to science and technology, there will be more opportunities for the future generation."
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FIG. S6. Relative frequencies of agreement, disagreement and neutral stance for each knowledge category towards the remaining
attitude items analyzed, with and without the inclusion of neutral answers. Shaded areas highlight the four consecutive
knowledge bins with highest agreement in each attitude item. Curve fit equations on Tables S5 and S6.
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TABLE S5. Linear and quadratic fit equations for agreement and disagreement curves as a function of knowledge for each
attitude item when neutral answers are not considered.
Linear Projection R^2 Quadratic Projection R^2
Agreement 0,109x + 0,795 0,944 0,079x^2 + 0,03x + 0,808 0,976
Disagreement -0,109x + 0,205 0,944 -0,079x^2 + -0,03x + 0,192 0,976
Agreement -0,327x + 0,486 0,910 -0,316x^2 + -0,011x + 0,433 0,964
Disagreement 0,327x + 0,514 0,910 0,316x^2 + 0,011x + 0,567 0,964
Agreement -0,393x + 0,823 0,943 -0,37x^2 + -0,023x + 0,761 0,997
Disagreement 0,393x + 0,177 0,943 0,37x^2 + 0,023x + 0,239 0,997
Agreement -0,353x + 0,554 0,958 -0,262x^2 + -0,091x + 0,511 0,991
Disagreement 0,353x + 0,446 0,958 0,262x^2 + 0,091x + 0,489 0,991
Agreement -0,024x + 0,589 0,130 0,044x^2 + -0,067x + 0,596 0,159
Disagreement 0,024x + 0,411 0,130 -0,044x^2 + 0,067x + 0,404 0,159
Agreement -0,088x + 0,75 0,377 -0,437x^2 + 0,349x + 0,677 0,969
Disagreement 0,088x + 0,25 0,377 0,437x^2 + -0,349x + 0,323 0,969
Agreement 0,037x + 0,794 0,524 -0,101x^2 + 0,138x + 0,777 0,769
Disagreement -0,037x + 0,206 0,524 0,101x^2 + -0,138x + 0,223 0,769
Agreement -0,568x + 0,789 0,991 -0,207x^2 + -0,361x + 0,754 0,999
Disagreement 0,568x + 0,211 0,991 0,207x^2 + 0,361x + 0,246 0,999
Agreement -0,271x + 0,883 0,896 -0,357x^2 + 0,086x + 0,823 0,995
Disagreement 0,271x + 0,117 0,896 0,357x^2 + -0,086x + 0,177 0,995
Agreement 0,029x + 0,857 0,532 0,071x^2 + -0,042x + 0,869 0,729
Disagreement -0,029x + 0,143 0,532 -0,071x^2 + 0,042x + 0,131 0,729
att_interest
att_daily_life
att_fast
att_oppor
Without neutral answers
att_comfort
att_natural_resources
att_faith
att_environ
att_research_animal
att_res_dangerous
TABLE S6. Linear and quadratic fit equations for agreement and disagreement curves as a function of knowledge for each
attitude item when neutral answers are considered.
Linear Projection R^2 Quadratic Projection R^2
Agreement 0,411x + 0,495 0,845 -0,641x^2 + 1,052x + 0,387 0,976
Neutral -0,384x + 0,371 0,719 0,887x^2 + -1,271x + 0,52 0,966
Disagreement -0,027x + 0,134 0,147 -0,247x^2 + 0,219x + 0,093 0,910
Agreement -0,028x + 0,232 0,020 -0,702x^2 + 0,675x + 0,114 0,864
Neutral -0,643x + 0,596 0,883 0,907x^2 + -1,55x + 0,748 0,996
Disagreement 0,67x + 0,172 0,991 -0,205x^2 + 0,875x + 0,138 0,997
Agreement -0,055x + 0,474 0,052 -0,902x^2 + 0,847x + 0,323 0,927
Neutral -0,354x + 0,448 0,739 0,768x^2 + -1,122x + 0,577 0,963
Disagreement 0,409x + 0,077 0,990 0,134x^2 + 0,275x + 0,099 0,997
Agreement -0,002x + 0,264 0,000 -0,807x^2 + 0,805x + 0,129 0,952
Neutral -0,664x + 0,588 0,861 1,035x^2 + -1,7x + 0,761 0,995
Disagreement 0,666x + 0,148 0,991 -0,228x^2 + 0,894x + 0,11 0,998
Agreement 0,214x + 0,346 0,646 -0,528x^2 + 0,742x + 0,258 0,898
Neutral -0,403x + 0,414 0,708 0,98x^2 + -1,383x + 0,578 0,976
Disagreement 0,189x + 0,239 0,713 -0,452x^2 + 0,641x + 0,164 0,975
Agreement 0,306x + 0,38 0,515 -1,163x^2 + 1,468x + 0,186 0,992
Neutral -0,541x + 0,513 0,772 1,121x^2 + -1,661x + 0,701 0,984
Disagreement 0,235x + 0,106 0,959 0,042x^2 + 0,193x + 0,114 0,961
Agreement 0,486x + 0,356 0,786 -0,975x^2 + 1,461x + 0,193 0,989
Neutral -0,574x + 0,553 0,787 1,154x^2 + -1,728x + 0,747 0,991
Disagreement 0,088x + 0,091 0,780 -0,179x^2 + 0,267x + 0,061 0,988
Agreement -0,284x + 0,551 0,641 -0,767x^2 + 0,483x + 0,422 0,939
Neutral -0,341x + 0,331 0,726 0,709x^2 + -1,051x + 0,45 0,926
Disagreement 0,626x + 0,118 0,998 0,058x^2 + 0,568x + 0,128 0,998
Agreement 0,1x + 0,53 0,101 -1,135x^2 + 1,234x + 0,339 0,943
Neutral -0,41x + 0,42 0,704 0,984x^2 + -1,394x + 0,585 0,964
Disagreement 0,31x + 0,051 0,979 0,15x^2 + 0,16x + 0,076 0,994
Agreement 0,447x + 0,461 0,807 -0,8x^2 + 1,247x + 0,327 0,972
Neutral -0,487x + 0,459 0,768 1,009x^2 + -1,496x + 0,628 0,979
Disagreement 0,04x + 0,08 0,355 -0,209x^2 + 0,249x + 0,045 0,973
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